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Abstract Biometric systems on mobile devices are an 
increasingly ubiquitous method for identity verification. The 
majority of contemporary devices have an embedded fingerprint 
sensor which may be used for a variety of transactions including 
unlock a device or sanction a payment. In this study we explore 
how easy it is to successfully attack a fingerprint system using a 
fake finger manufactured from commonly available materials. 
Importantly our attackers were novices to producing the fingers 
and were also constrained by time. Our study shows the relative 
ease that modern devices can be attacked and the material 
combinations that lead to these attacks. 
Keywords biometric systems, fingerprints, spoofing, attack 
assessments) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The growth in the use of mobile devices for everyday 
communication and transactions requires usable and secure 
methods of verifying the identity of a user. Biometric systems 
(verification though a personal characteristic or trait) are 
widely deployed on modern mobile devices where both general 
sensors (such as a camera or microphone) or specific biometric 
sensors (for example a fingerprint capture device) enable the 
donation of samples. Aided by open operating system 
interaction, the use of biometrics as a verification method is 
finding new uses beyond the conversional device unlock or 
transactional verification. 
Fingerprint is the most widely used biometric on mobile 
devices. This popularity potentially leads to high gains in 
attacking or spoofing ownership of the finger. Many studies 
have investigated methods for generating fake fingers but 
these are usually lead by ethical hacking groups or researchers 
with a large expertise in biometric systems research. In this 
current study, we wished to explore how easy it is for relative 
novices, using materials readily available on-line or in local 
shops and using open internet searches for background 
research, to create a fake finger and successfully attack a range 
of contemporary mobile devices. Our motivation for this study 
is twofold. Firstly, we wish to ascertain the ease with which 
successful fingerprints can be generated. Secondly, by 
exploring the materials that lead to a successful attack, we 
illustrate new areas for preventative research for future sensors. 
II. MOBILE DEVICE FINGERPRINT SPOOFING
A biometric system can be vulnerable at many points: at 
presentation level, identity claim, data transfer, quality and 
feature extraction, decision thresholds, etc. [1] and this also 
applies to biometric sensors embedded in mobile devices. For 
instance, vulnerabilities were found creating a malicious 
application that steals the temporary fingerprint image by 
accessing its memory space or extracting a stored template 
from the non-volatile memory and recreating the feature points 
of the fingerprint [2]. In addition, several security analyses 
have been made using altered fingerprints [3], [4] and one was 
performed specifically on mobile devices [5]. This paper will 
focus on presentation attacks, that is, a presentation to the 
biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering 
with the operation of the biometric system [6]. 
Presentation attacks can be overcome in several ways, 
divided in two groups: software and hardware PAD 
(Presentation Attack Detection) mechanisms [7]. Software 
PAD mechanisms read the captured sample and perform image 
processing and classification to distinguish whether the finger 
is real or not. Hardware PAD adds additional sensors 
(temperature sensor, multispectral cameras, etc. [8]) to make 
this distinction. Hardware solutions have lower error rates than 
the software ones [9] but are in general more expensive or 
bulky due to the additional equipment needed [8]. Thus, 
hardware mechanisms are usually not considered for mobile 
devices, as these solutions should be as cheap and small as 
possible. 
Many studies and evaluations have been carried out 
regarding presentation attacks on desktop fingerprint sensors. 
Already in 1990, several sensors were tested using artefacts, 
and the system failed to reject them even from the first attempt 
[10]. On 2000, an evaluation was performed on [11] by 
calculating the acceptance rate of 1 users finger made with 
gelatine on 11 scanners, where the artefacts were accepted by 
the systems in a very high percentage (the lowest being 67% 
fake finger acceptance rate). On 2002, several more attacks 
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were successful using latent fingerprint reactivation on 6 
capacitive, 2 optical and 1 thermal sensors [12]. In [13], 10 
capture subjects fingers were used to create gelatine artefacts 
and use them on 3 sensors, getting success rates from 44.6% to 
76%. On all experiments, only index fingers were used. 
Nevertheless, in general, these studies do not follow a thorough 
evaluation procedure nor standard, and merely prove when a 
certain material or technique is effective on specific sensors at 
least once. 
The Liveness Detection (LivDet) competitions started in 
2009 [14] and continued on 2011 [15], 2013 [16] and 2015 
[17]. Their goal was to compare different liveness detection 
(Presentation Attack Detection, as required by the standard 
ISO/IEC 30107-3 [6]) mechanisms by using them on a very 
large database of fake fingers (made of gelatine, latex, ecoflex, 
Play-Doh, silicone, wood glue and modasil). Different 
academic institutions or industries could try their algorithms on 
the database. Four different sensors were used to acquire the 
images and the evaluations were done using a common testing 
protocol. 
There are a number of reports on vulnerabilities that were 
found in mobile devices. In 2013, when the first iPhone with an 
embedded fingerprint sensor came out, the Chaos Computer 
Club [18] proved that it was possible to fool the sensor using a 
white glue fake finger covered with graphite, and the 
fingerprint could be stolen from the phone screen using a 
scanner and doing some very basic image processing. 
Nonetheless, this was only reported once in a video, no 
evaluation was performed. In 2016, fake fingers were printed 
using conductive silver ink. The researchers had a processed 
sample of the fingerprint image beforehand, so they could be 
used directly on the mobile phone sensor without having the 
additional step of creating moulds [19]. This was a technical 
report to inform about the vulnerability. 
In 2018, an article reported on 3 different PAD evaluations 
on desktop and mobile device fingerprint sensors [20]. First, 4 
desktop fingerprint sensors of different technologies were 
evaluated by attacking them with 7 different fake finger 
materials. All of them were successfully attacked by an 
experienced attacker. Secondly, a similar test was carried out 
on 5 smartphones with embedded sensors using the most 
successful materials from the previous evaluation, which also 
hacked the 5 sensors. Lastly, 15 simulated attackers with no 
background in biometrics were gathered to create fake fingers 
of several materials, and they had one week to attack the 
fingerprint sensors of the same 5 smartphones, with the starting 
point of a short video with the techniques to create them. All 5 
smartphones were successfully attacked by an inexperienced 
attacker. 
III. THE CHALLENGE 
The novice participants in our study were all Research 
Fellows from the EU AMBER project. Although each of the 
Fellows were in the first year of their studies in biometric 
systems research, none had undertaken work directly related to 
fingerprint spoofing. Working in groups of three or four, each 
team was given the task to experiment with the creation of a 
series of fake fingers in an attempt to unlock a variety of 
Android-based smartphones. Whilst it is possible to 
hypothesise that a seasoned hacker would have access to 
materials, techniques and expertise to maximise their chances 
of success, we were interested in exploring the performance of 
techniques implemented by non-experts. The three key factors 
in undertaking this study were that: 
1. Participants had no previous direct experience of 
fingerprint spoofing. 
2. Materials used were able to be purchased through outlets 
such as Amazon or supermarkets. Teams were able to 
research methods and materials on-line for a one-week 
period prior to the study. 
3. Teams were limited a 12-hour development and testing 
limit. 
An overview of the technology of the devices within the 
study are detailed in Table I. Note that the sensors on devices 
D4 and D5 are located on the rear of the device. Each of our 
devices are distinct in terms of sensor position or donation 
method (touch/swipe). All devices ran the Android operating 
system and used the standard method for capturing and 
comparing fingerprints for unlocking the device. 











D1  5.1 Rectangular Front Touch 
D2  5.7 Rectangular Front Swipe 
D3  5.2 Rectangular Side Touch 
D4  5.8 Rectangular Rear Touch 
D5  5.2 Circular Rear Touch 
 
There are two different methodologies for fabricating fake 
fingerprints: 
• Direct casts: A target is asked to press her/his finger on a 
material which is soft and mouldable but hardens with 
time or when cooled or heated. Using this fabrication 
process, high quantity moulds can be produced, achieving 
a fully three-dimensional sample of original print. 
• Indirect casts: In this methodology, there is no need for 
cooperation of the target. Indirect casts can be pulled from 
latent fingerprints retrieved from natural secretions left by 
friction ridge skin on a surface during a contact or from a 
high-quality image of the finger. In comparison with the 
direct method, this method requires more complicated 
fabrication techniques. 
In the interests of time, all the teams used a direct cast 
method of creating the fake finger. These methods relied on the 
creation of a mould from which an artefact was created. Given 
the limited time constraints, the teams focused on exploratory 
efforts at the expense of scientific rigour. With the limited time 
it was not feasible to use materials and methods which required 
long or multiple periods to set/harden. The methods used can 
be separated into the processes of creating a mould and 
creating a Presentation Attack Instrument (PAI or artefact) 
from the mould. In this section we detail the processes trialled 
in the production of these elements.  
A. Mould Materials 
A series of materials were trialled wherein a finger was 
directly applied to a formed ball of a pliable material (denoted 
as dry moulds) including: BluTack, Plasticine, 
Siligum, unbranded Silicon Gum and Play-Doh. Other 
materials that were unsuccessful in forming dry moulds were: 
magic putty, rubber putty, chewing gum and clay. 
Three other methods were used to create a hot mould. In 
both these methods a finger was inserted into the heated/melted 
substance which was then allowed to cool to form the mould: 
hot glue, candle wax and stamp wax. An attempt was made to 
form a mould from melted gummy sweets, however this was 
unsuccessful. 
Fig. 1a and 1b shows two formed dry moulds from two 
different materials, whilst Fig. 1c shows the donation process 
with a third material. 
 
a)   b)  
c)  
Fig. 1. a) Siligum mould, b) BluTack mould, c) mould creation process 
B. Presentation Attack Instrument (PAI) 
The formation of PAIs can be divided into a dry 
subcategory which were formed by pressing the material 
directly into a mould. Wet materials were either substances 
that were heated, inserted into the mould and allowed to cool, 
or were in liquid form and subsequently dried in the mould. In 
all cases, the formed instrument was removed from the mould 
and directly presented to a mobile device fingerprint sensor. 
The range of dry materials used were: Plasticine, Plasticine 
+ conductive paint, Play-Doh and BluTack.  
The wet materials trialled within the experiments were: art 
glue, art glue + graphite, alginate, gelatine powder, gelatine 
powder + glycerine, gelatine powder + conductive ink, gelatine 
sheet, gelatine + graphite, gelatine + water, candle wax, body 
wax + conductive paint and face mask. A further method, art 
glue, did not rely on the use of mould. Fig. 2 shows two 
gelatine-based PAI samples. 
a)   b)  
Fig. 2. A gelatine based PAI a) with and b) without added graphite. 
A total of 35 experiments with different combinations of 
mould and PAI were conducted across three groups and the 
five devices. Table 2 shows the numeric identifier for each 
combination of materials. Given the timescale of the activity it 
was not possible to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 
each combination, however each mould and PAI material was 
used at least once. The verification trial method followed the 
same protocol for all attempts: 
1. A genuine finger is enrolled on a particular device 
following the standard in-build operating system 
enrolment protocol. 
2. A PAI generated from the enrolled genuine finger is 
presented to the same device in an attempt to 
unlock/access the phone. 
3. Whether the PAI was recognised as a finger, the number 
of presentations and the number of successful 
unlock/access were recorded. 
IV. RESULTS 
Table III shows the results from each of the individual 
experiments. A majority (25 out of 35) of PAIs were 
recognised as finger by a device, indicating the relative ease 
within which a finger can be mimicked. The number of 
successful attack verifications were varied, with only one 
experiment achieving 100% attack success for each 
presentation (experiment 21). 16 out of the 35 PAIs resulted in 
at least one successful attack on the system, with 9 PAIs being 
recognised as a finger but not leading to a successful 
verification. 
It is possible to explore the 35 PAI results in a number of 
ways. Table IV shows the number of successful attacks on each 
device. It is evident that there is considerable variation across 
sensors and systems. D4 was not compromised, however only 
two experiments were conducted on this device  in each case, 
the sensor could not detect a finger. Device D3 produced the 
poorest performance in terms of attack with 75% of 
presentation attempts being erroneously verified. There seems 
to be no significant performance difference between swipe and 
touch sensor technology. 
Table V details the results separated by mould material. 
Siligum resulted in the highest number of successful attacks, 
nearly double the next successful material (candle wax). 
Siligum was used in the highest number of experiments, 
reflecting the experience of the novice researcher in that once 
they had discovered a successful mould material, this was used 
for subsequent experiments across various PAIs. A number of 
moulds (BluTack, no mould and unbranded silicon) resulted in 
PAIs that unable to spoof the valid finger. 












D1 15 8 115 23 20.0% 
D2 4 4 50 3 6.0% 
D3 4 4 52 39 75.0% 
D4 2 0 0 0 0.0% 
D5 10 9 142 25 17.6% 














BluTack 3 0 0 0 0.0% 
Candle wax 1 1 10 2 20.0% 
Hot glue 5 4 50 9 18.0% 
No mould 2 1 10 0 0.0% 
Plasticine 3 2 60 7 11.7% 
Play-Doh 1 0 0 0 0.0% 
Siligum 18 15 204 70 34.3% 
Stamp wax 1 1 13 2 15.4% 
Unbranded 
silicon 
1 1 12 0 0.0% 
 
Table BI explores the material used to create the PAI. It can 
be observed that a number of materials with additives (art glue 
+ graphite, body wax + conductive paint and gelatine sheet + 
graphite) perform well. Alginate as pure substance also 
produced a 51.7% success rate. 















Alginate 3 3 60 31 51.7% 
Art Glue 3 1 10 0 0.0% 
Art glue + graphite 2 2 30 22 73.3% 
BluTack 1 0 0 0 0.0% 
Body wax + conductive paint 2 2 22 9 40.9% 
Candle wax 1 0 0 0 0.0% 
Candle wax + conductive ink 1 0 0 0 0.0% 
Facemask 1 0 0 0 0.0% 
Gelatine powder 3 2 23 0 0.0% 
Gelatine powder + conductive ink 1 1 11 0 0.0% 
Gelatine powder + glycerine 1 1 22 0 0.0% 
Gelatine sheet 7 4 69 9 13.0% 
Gelatine sheet + graphite 4 4 47 14 29.8% 
Gelatine sheet + water 2 2 30 3 10.0% 
Plasticine 1 1 10 1 10.0% 
Plasticine + conductive paint 1 1 10 1 10.0% 
Play-Doh 1 1 15 0 0.0% 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we have shown that it is possible, with limited 
experience and using available materials, to successfully attack 
a range of contemporary mobile devices using biometric 
fingerprints. In doing so we have demonstrated the material 
combinations that lead to successful (and unsuccessful) 
combinations. We recognise that this study is not without its 
limitations: i) each material was not tested on multiple fingers 
or across multiple users, ii) different versions of Android were 
installed across the devices, which may contain different 
fingerprint recognition algorithms/systems, iii) there was no 
sample quality assessment of the PAIs which would indicate 
the likely performance/consistency of the formed attack 
instrument. Despite the limitations, we have illustrated a range 
of techniques that can be explored further in terms of spoofing 
attack and future prevention. 
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    1   2   33       
Plasticine           25, 
34 
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Siligum 1
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       13          
Play-Doh     14             
Hot glue Wet 
 
 32         27, 
35 
29 28     
Candle wax           30       
Stamp wax            31      
No mould                  15 
 
TABLE III.  LIST OF EXPERIMENTS AND ATTACK RESULTS 
Experiment 
Number 






1 D1 1 BluTack Art glue U    
2 D1 1 BluTack Gelatine powder U    
3 D1 1 Siligum Play-Doh D 15 0 0.0% 
4 D1 1 Siligum BluTack U    
5 D1 1 Siligum Gelatine powder D 11 0 0.0% 
6 D1 1 Siligum Gelatine powder + glycerine D 22 0 0.0% 
7 D1 1 Siligum Gelatine powder + conductive ink D 11 0 0.0% 
8 D1 1 Siligum Gelatine sheet D 9 0 0.0% 
9 D1 1 Siligum Gelatine sheet + graphite D 5 2 40.0% 
10 D5 1 Siligum Gelatine sheet + graphite D 9 5 55.5% 
11 D1 1 Siligum Candle wax U    
12 D1 1 Siligum Candle wax + conductive ink U    
13 D1 1 Unbranded silicon Gelatine powder D 12 0 0.0% 
14 D1 1 Play-Doh Art Glue U    
15 D1 1 No mould Facemask U    
16 D3 2 Siligum Plasticine D 10 1 10.0% 
17 D2 2 Siligum Art glue + graphite D 10 3 30.0% 
18 D3 2 Siligum Art glue + graphite D 20 19 95.0% 
19 D1 2 Siligum Alginate D 30 21 70.0% 
20 D2 2 Siligum Alginate D 20 0 0.0% 
21 D3 2 Siligum Alginate D 10 10 100.0% 
22 D2 2 Siligum Body wax + conductive paint D 10 0 0.0% 
23 D3 2 Siligum Body wax + conductive paint D 12 9 75.0% 
24 D2 2 No mould Art Glue D 10 0 0.0% 
25 D5 3 Plasticine Gelatine sheet D 40 5 12.5% 
26 D5 3 Plasticine Gelatine sheet + water D 20 2 10.0% 
27 D5 3 Hot glue Gelatine sheet D 10 2 20.0% 
28 D5 3 Hot glue Gelatine sheet + water D 10 1 10.0% 
29 D5 3 Hot glue Gelatine sheet + graphite D 20 5 25.0% 
30 D5 3 Candle wax Gelatine sheet D 10 2 20.0% 
31 D5 3 Stamp wax Gelatine sheet + graphite D 13 2 15.4% 
32 D5 3 Hot glue Plasticine + conductive paint D 10 1 10.0% 
33 D5 3 BluTack Gelatine sheet U    
34 D4 3 Plasticine Gelatine sheet U    
35 D4 3 Hot glue Gelatine sheet U    
 
